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THE PRIVILEGE STUDY: AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
DANIEL W. SHUMANt
MYRON S. WEINE4
The recognition of a privileged relationship between psychothera-
pist andpatient that grants the patient the right to bar the introduction
of some relevant evidence in judicial proceedings, is based on the as-
sumption that without such an assurance of confidentiality there will be
no effective therapy. In this Article Professors Shuman and Weiner
examine this assumption and the opposing belief that granting a privi-
lege seriously undermines the judicial process. Their research focuses
on the effect of enactment of a privilege statute in Texas, asperceived
by therapists, patients, lay-persons and judges. The authors conclude
that both proponents and opponents of the privilege have overstated
their case, the existence of theprivilege is of consequence tofewpatients
and in few cases. Through their analysis the authors have clarffed the
stakes in the controversy and have made it possible to weigh the com-
peting policy interests more intelligently.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recognition of a privileged relationship, a rule of evidence that con-
fers upon a person a right to prevent introduction of relevant evidence in judi-
cial proceedings, stands in stark contrast to the predilection of courts to receive
all relevant evidence in judicial proceedings.' A privilege is the result of a
balancing process; the relationship in question and its underlying values must
be thought more important than the accurate outcome of judicial proceedings,
t Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.S. 1969, J.D. 1972, Uni-
versity of Arizona.
t Professor of Clinical Psychiatry and Vice Chairman, Department of Psychiatry, Univer-
sity of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas, Texas. M.D. 1957, Tulane University.
This research was supported by a grant from the Southern Methodist University School of
Law.
Maureen Armour, Meg Davidson and Rande Herrell, former and present law students at
Southern Methodist University School of Law, provided valuable assistance in the library and
field research for this Article.
1. Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle
that "the public.., has a right to every man's evidence." United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950). As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted "only to the
very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has
a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational
means for ascertaining truth." E1kakr v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting). Accord, Unted States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980).
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and the absence of the privilege must threaten to destroy the relationship and
its underlying values.2 Most commentators who have examined the physician-
patient privilege have concluded that, while the physician-patient relationship
is extremely important, on balance, the absence of a privilege does not pose a
sufficient threat to the physician-patient relationship to justify the enactment
of a privilege. 3 This conclusion has been tempered, however, with respect to a
narrow category of health professionals treating mental or emotional
problems-psychotherapists. 4
Psychotherapist-patient relationships, it is thought, are unlike physician-
patient relationships; while a person with a broken leg may not hesitate to
consult a physician in the absence of a privilege, a person troubled by an ex-
tramarital affair or compulsion to steal may hesitate to consult a therapist in
the absence of a privilege. It is assumed that unless patients are assured that
their communications on sensitive and potentially embarrassing subjects will
be kept inviolate, no effective therapy for mental or emotional problems will
occur. Thus, those commentators who examined the psychotherapist-patient
privilege have uncritically accepted the requirement of a privilege for effective
psychotherapeutic relationships.5
Although superficially sound, the acceptance of the requirement of a psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege for effective psychotherapy rests upon untested
hunches. There is good reason to question these assumptions. The United
Kingdom 6 and the common-law provinces in Canada 7 do not recognize a phy-
2. The traditional analysis of this balancing process is credited to Dean Wigmore. See 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Another approach to this question is
David Louiselrs. See Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges m Federal
Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101 (1957).
3. E.g., Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the
Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 Yale L.J. 607 (1943); Ladd, A Modem Code of Evi-
dence, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 213 (1942); Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 Colum. L. Rev. 388 (1906).
4. E.g., Guttmacher & Weihofen, Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Pa-
tient, 28 Ind. L.J. 32 (1952); Louisell & Sinclair, The Supreme Court of California, 196970-
Foreword: Reflections on the Law of Privileged Communications-The Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege in Perspective, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 30 (1971); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at
the Medical Privilege, 6 Wayne L. Rev. 175 (1960).
Who is a psychotherapist? Do only psychiatrists and psychologists qualify, or does the term
also embrace psychiatric social workers and lay analysts? See Comment, Underprivileged Com-
munications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social
Workers, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1050 (1973); Note, The Social Worker-Client Relationship and Privi-
leged Communications, 1965 Wash. U.L.Q. 362. To avoid prolonged debate on that question at
this juncture, psychotherapist, as used in this Article, will be limited by the definition of psycho-
therapist-patient set forth in Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504(a)(2), which is restricted to physicians
treating mental or emotional conditions and psychologists:
A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or any
nation or reasonably believed by the patient to be so, while engaged in the diagnosis or
treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a person
licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while simi-
larly engaged.
5. See note 4 supra.
6. 30 Halsbury's Laws of England, Medicine, Pharmacy, Drugs and Medicinal Products
§ 19 (4th ed. 1980).
7. Dickens, Legal Protection of Psychiatric Confidentiality, 1 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 255,
260 (1978). Quebec, with its French civil-law roots does, like France, recognize a physician-pa-
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sician-patient or a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Psychotherapists in the
United Kingdom and the common-law provinces in Canada, therefore, treat
patients without the benefit of a privilege and have not claimed, as have psy-
chotherapists in the United States, that its absence prevents effective therapy.
In the United States, psychotherapy has grown despite the nonexistence of a
privilege in some states and only a qualified privilege in others.8 Yet no em-
pirical research supporting the need for a privilege is cited by the drafters of
psychotherapist-patient privileges nor is any to be found in the literature
favorable to the privilege. 9 Courts and legislatures have been asked to choose
between psychotherapist-patient relationships and accurate judicial proceed-
ings without empirical evidence of the need for the privilege in therapy or its
effect on the conduct of judicial proceedings. The consequences of an errone-
ous choice may be substantial-the curtailment of effective therapy for many
thousands of emotionally troubled people or inaccurate decisions in judicial
proceedings when life, liberty or property is at stake. Given these risks, a more
accurate basis for accommodating these interests than untested hunches is
necessitated.
This Article, the result of an empirical study conducted by a lawyer and a
psychiatrist, attempts to examine these issues. It was triggered by the passage
of a psychotherapist-patient privilege statute by the Texas Legislature in
1979.10 Prior to 1979 Texas had no general physician-patient or psychothera-
pist-patient privilege statute. The statute's passage raised a host of questions:
Would the statute result in an increased number of persons seeking therapy?
tient privilege. Id. See also Tollefson, Privileged Communications in Canada (Common Law), 4
Int'l Symp. on Comp. L. 32, 44-45 (1967).
8. Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 Calif. L.
Rev. 1025, 1038-39 (1974).
9. For example, the proposed psychotherapist-patient privilege of Rule 504 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence was supported by a quotation from the report of the Group for the Advance-
ment of Psychiatry, ReportNo. 45, Confidentiality and Privileged Communication in the Practice
of Psychiatry (Report No. 45, 1960) [hereinafter cited as GAP Report]:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality. His
capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability
to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being
able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication.
Where there may be exceptions to this general rule... , there is wide agreement that
confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment. The relationship
may well be likened to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not
only explore the very depths of their patients' conscious, but their unconscious feelings
and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's
awareness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to
secrecy blocks successful treatment.
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504 advisory committee note (quoting GAP Report, supra, at 92), re-
printed in 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973). This quotation contains a myriad of assumptions about
patient behavior-for example, that patients seek assurances of confidentiality and privilege, or
that they behave differently m therapy without these assurances. Instead of being given evidence
that these assumptions are correct, we are asked to accept as true the conclusions of the GAP
Report.
10. Act of May 17, 1979, ch. 239, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 512 (codified at Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. 1982)). See Wilcox, Release of Medical Information to Patients
and Insurance Companies, 76 Tex. Med. 69 (1980); Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privi-
lege in Texas, 18 Hous. L. Rev. 137 (1980).
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Would the statute change the therapeutic relationship? Had patients ex-
pressed concern about confidentiality prior to the privilege's enactment? If so,
how were these concerns addressed by therapists? Had therapists been com-
pelled by courts to reveal confidential patient communications prior to the
privilege's enactment? If so, how frequently did that occur and what effect did
it have on the course of therapy and the accuracy of judicial proceedings?
Would the statute result in less accurate judicial proceedings? To attempt to
answer these questions, which underlie the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
we designed and conducted a multifaceted research project.
We employed four questionnaires: a therapist questionnaire, I1 a patient
questionnaire, 12 a lay questionnaire 13 and a judicial questionnaire. 14 The
therapist questionnaire was mailed to psychiatrists practicing in the Dallas
area. The patient questionnaire was distributed by psychiatrists to patients in
therapy. The lay questionnaire was distributed to students at evening adult
education classes at a nearby university. And the judicial questionnaire was
administered to state and federal judges in Dallas County. In addition, we
secured data from Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Texas showing the number of
billings for psychotherapy before and after the enactment of the privilege
statute.15
Before proceeding to this research, however, it is useful to examine the
theoretical justifications for this privilege in greater detail.
II. THE PRIVILEGE AND ITS JUSTIFICATION
A. Psychotherapy
We pledge him to obey the fundamental rule of analysis, which is
henceforward to govern his behavior towards us. He is to tell us not
only what he can say authentically and willingly, what will give him
relief like a confession, but everything else as well that his self obser-
vation yields him, everything that comes into his head, even if it is
disagreeable for him to say it, even if it seems unimportant or actually
nonsensical. 16
Psychotherapy is the treatment of mental or emotional disorder by verbal
or other symbolic communication between patient and therapist. 17 Psycho-
therapy is frequently augmented by drugs, but it is often employed as the sole
mode of treatment, especially for interpersonal problems or for dealing with
certain thoughts, feelings or actions that people find disagreeable to them-
selves or others. Although there are many types of psychotherapy, the model
11. See Table 3, Appendix infra.
12. See Table 2, Appendix infra.
13. See Table I, Appendix infra.
14. See Table 4, Appendix infra.
15. See Table 5, Appendix infra.
16. 23 S. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, in Standard Edition of the Complete Psycho-
logical Works of Sigmund Freud 141 (1964) (emphasis in original).
17. 3. Kovel, A Complete Guide to Therapy 264 (1976).
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upon which privilege arguments primarily rest is psychoanalysis, 18 originated
by Sigmund Freud.
Based on his experience in treating emotional disorders, Freud theorized
that certain types of emotional problems result from the rekindling of re-
pressed emotional conflicts from early childhood. 19 Those conflicts are re-
pressed into the unconscious portion of the mind because they are
unacceptable to the conscious self. The treatment brings these conflicts to con-
sciousness so that the patient can more adequately deal with or resolve them.
Free association is the technique by which the psychoanalyst and patient gain
access to the patient's unconscious mind.20 Hence, Freud's fundamental rule
for a patient in psychoanalysis, stated above, is that the patient must disclose
to the therapist all of his thoughts or feelings. Freud concluded that withhold-
ing material of any sort from the therapist served the purpose of resistance, an
automatic attempt by the patient's mind to block the emergence of material
from the unconscious. The work of psychoanalysis is removing the patient's
resistance to discovery of what has been repressed.21 Unless the patient is as-
sured that the therapist has no authority over him-for example, through dis-
closure of their communications in court-the built-in resistance to full
disclosure cannot be overcome. 22 The patient must trust the therapist; this can
occur only if the patient alone holds the key to disclosure of matters revealed
in therapy.23
There are many reasons for a patient to resist the full disclosure thought
necessary in psychoanalysis. Many people view mental illness as more embar-
rassing than physical illness.24 Given the social stigma our society attaches to
mental illness,25 many individuals with serious mental or emotional problems
may avoid even the initial consultation of a psychotherapist, fearing that
others' knowledge of the inception of the relationship will result in their being
stigmatized as mentally ill.
Effective psychotherapy frequently entails revelation of intimate and dis-
18. See, e.g., R. Slovenko, Psychotherapy, Confidentiality and Privileged Communications
40-42 (1966). The arguments for the psychotherapist-patient privilege use psychoanalysis as a
springboard because of its theory that the patient's problems result from conflicts repressed in the
unconscious that must be probed to treat the patient. See text accompanying notes 19-23 infra.
However, not all psychotherapies seek to deal with the unconscious. See text accompanying notes
47-52 infra.
19. H. Kaplan, A. Freedman & B. Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 2128 (3d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry].
20. Id. at 2115. See also R. Greenson, The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis 32-33
(1967).
21. Greenson, supra note 20, at 59-66.
22. Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement for the Therapist: Technical Necessities for
Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 1093, 1094 (1974); Plaut, A Perspec-
tive on Confidentiality, 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 1021, 1022 (1974).
23. Uchill, Deviation from Confidentiality and the Therapeutic Holding Environment, 7 Int'l
J. Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy 208, 210 (1978-79).
24. M. Guttmacher & H. Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 271 (1952); Developments in the
Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1200 (1974).
25. See Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Con-
necticut Statute, 36 Conn. B.J. 175, 178 (1962).
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turbing details of a very personal nature26----"the patient's inner most fears and
fantasies. ' 27 Patients are thought to be less likely to disclose this type of infor-
mation if there is a chance it will become public knowledge. 28 To obtain
disclosure of this information the therapist must be "able to assure patients
that their confidences will be protected." 29 "[Clonfidentiality is the sine qua
non for successful psychiatric treatment. 30
Based upon these assumptions, five basic premises for a psychotherapist-
patient privilege are advanced:
1. The absence of a privilege deters people from seeking needed
therapy.
In the absence of a privilege, potential patients may refrain from
seeking help for fear of being labeled mentally ill because of the
stigma attached to a label of mental illness. The advantage of a priv-
ilege at this stage is the assurance of privacy, that the individual's
status as the patient of a psychotherapist will not be revealed to
others.
2. The absence of a privilege delays people from seeking needed
therapy.
Although the potential stigma that flows from the mental illness label
may not result in a failure to seek therapy, it may result in a delay in
seeking therapy, thereby extending the duration of a patient's emo-
tional problems. Thus, a privilege may result in more rapid consul-
tation with a therapist.
3. The absence ofa privilege impairs the quality of therapy.
Successful treatment requires frank disclosure that cannot occur
without the assurance of confidentiality that aids in developing the
trust necessary between therapist and patient.
4. The absence ofa privilege causespremature termination of therapy.
The psychotherapist-patient relationship is based upon trust. If the
therapist reveals a confidential patient communication under court
order, that trust will be destroyed and the relationship will terminate
prematurely. The privilege avoids the possibility of compelled judi-
cial disclosure.
5. The absence ofa privilege leads to compelled judicial disclosure of
patient communications, which results in psychological harm to
patients.
The absence of a privilege permits a court to order a therapist to
disclose relevant patient communications. These communications,
containing "the patient's inner most fears and fantasies," touch upon
26. Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 Temp. L.Q. 401,
405 (1957). See also M. Guttmacher & H. Weihofen, supra note 24, at 273.
27. Louisell & Sinclar, supra note 4, at 52.
28. Love & Yanity, Psychotherapy and the Law, Med. Trial Tech. Q. 405, 424 (1974).
29. Cal. Evid. Code § 1014 Senate Comm. on Judiciary comments (West 1966). See David-
off, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists (1973); Slovenko, supra note 4, at 185-87. See also Proposed
Fed. R. Evid. 504 advisory committee note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
30. GAP Report, supra note 9, at 92.
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very sensitive components of the patient. Public revelation of this
information will result in psychological harm to the patient.
These five theoretical premises raise questions to which no satisfactory
empirical answers have been provided. Do patients actually know about the
privilege and consider it when deciding to seek therapy or reveal information
in therapy? Do patients terminate therapy when their therapist is compelled to
testify? Are they harmed by disclosure? These five premises provide the core
questions for the empirical study discussed in part IV of this Article.
An argument in favor of the privilege that is not based upon any particu-
lar model of psychotherapy is that of the right to privacy. It rests upon the
notion that there are certain areas of human relations that ought to be left
undisturbed by the state.31 Included among these islands of immunity from
state molestation, it is argued, should be the psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship. On its face this argument turns on a choice between competing values
not at all subject to empirical validation. Which should society value more,
privacy in psychotherapy or accuracy in judicial decisions? 3 2 Upon scratching
the surface, however, one finds an empirical component to this question.
Few proponents of a right to privacy contend that it should be absolute?3
These individuals recognize that there may be values even more important
than privacy. Once it is conceded that the right to privacy is not absolute, the
complexion of the choice between privacy and accurate judicial decision-mak-
ing changes. How will the loss of privacy in a particular situation affect the
interests sought to be protected and how will the loss of relevant evidence
affect the conduct of trials? These questions are subject, at least in part, to
empirical research.
Even if one concludes that the nonutilitarian-privacy argument for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is totally devoid of assumptions subject to
empirical research, this research project is nonetheless important. The pro-
posed psychotherapist-patient privilege of the Federal Rules of Evidence,34
the California Evidence Code3s and the Connecticut Evidence Code,3 6 the
most significant recent psychotherapist-patient privilege proposals with writ-
ten legislative histories, have relied exclusively on the utilitarian justifica-
tion.3 7 It is therefore appropriate that these privileges be tested through
empirical research.
Other justifications for the psychotherapist-patient privilege have also
been advanced. It has been argued that psychiatric jargon is confusing be-
31. Krattenmacker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts--Alternative to the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 Geo. LJ. 61, 85-86 (1973); Louisell, supra note 2, at 110.
32. 23 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5422 (1980).
33. See, e.g., Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 Va. L.
Rev. 597, 622 (1980).
34. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504.
35. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1010-1026 (West Supp. 1981).
36. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146(c) (West Supp. 1981) (psychologist-patient privilege).
37. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504 advisory committee note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 242
(1973); Cal. Evid. Code § 1014, Senate Comm. on Judiciary comments (West 1966); Goldstein &
Katz, supra note 25.
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cause many words psychotherapists use have specialized meanings although
these same words when used by lay persons have other common meanings;
thus, judicial determinations should not rely on inherently confusing psychiat-
ric evidence.38 However, claims concerning the confusing aspects of psychiat-
ric testimony are not unique to psychiatric testimony resulting from
confidential communication. 39 They pervade most psychiatric testimony.
These claims may provide the basis for certain across-the-board limitations on
psychiatric testimony,4° but they provide no basis for singling out testimony
resulting from confidential communications for special restrictions.
Some proponents of the privilege argue that it should exist to protect psy-
chotherapists from the inconvenience and annoyance that witnesses frequently
suffer.41 Although the law may recognize certain privileged relationships, not
even the President of the United States is, by his office, immune from the
compulsory process of the courts to provide relevant evidence in a judicial
proceeding.42 "[T]he public ...has the right to every man's evidence." 43
Psychotherapists ought not, therefore, to enjoy any unique immunity from
compulsory process. Only if the theoretical justifications for the privilege
withstand scrutiny should the public's right to "every man's evidence" be lim-
ited. However, even before subjecting these theories to empirical scrutiny, the
theories themselves require closer examination.
B. Problems with the Privilege's Theoretical Justfcations
1. The absence of a privilege deters people from seeking
needed therapy.
This premise assumes that the privilege will cloak the existence of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship, thereby avoiding the label of mental ill-
ness on the patient. However, the physician-patient privilege has not been
construed, in its varying form from state to state, to protect against disclosure
of an individual's status as a patient unless to do so would reveal the substance
of the communication; 44 rather it protects against compelled disclosure of in-
formation communicated. Although there may be a better argument in favor
of protecting the identity of the patient under the privilege in psychotherapy,
38. GAP Report, supra note 9, at 92-93; Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Priv-
ilege: A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 Cath. U.L. Rev. 649 (1974).
39. See, e.g., J. Ziskin, Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony (1970).
40. See Dix, Mental Health Professionals in the Legal Process: Some Problems of Psychiatric
Dominance, 6 Law & Psychiatry Rev. 1 (1981); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption
of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 693 (1974). But see Hoffman,
Mental Health Professionals in the Legal Process: A Plea for Rational Applications of the
Clinical Method, 6 Law & Psychiatry Rev. 21 (1981).
41. See Katz, Privileged Communications: A Proposal for Reform, '1 Dalhousie L.. 597
(1974); Slovenko, supra note 38. The proposition that psychotherapists should be immunized
from the inconveniences suffered by other witnesses is closely akin to the proposition that privi-
leges are professional status symbols. Ladd, Privileges, 1969 Law & Soc. Ord. 555, 556.
42. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
43. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
44. C. McCormick, Handbook in the Law of Evidence § 9, at 215-16 (2d ed. 1962).
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this argument has yet to be recognized by the courts.45 Indeed, to claim the
privilege, the existence of a bona fide psychotherapist-patient relationship
must be shown as a preliminary matter,46 thereby defeating any absolute
claim to protect the identity of the patient. Thus the first premise is based
upon an erroneous assumption concerning the operation of privilege law.
The first premise also fails to take into account the existence of medical
insurance to pay for therapy. Unless an individual intends to pay for psycho-
therapy without third-party reimbursement, regardless of the privilege, people
other than the patient and therapist will learn of the relationship. Thus, even
if the privilege were to protect against disclosure of an individual's status as a
patient, the use of medical insurance to pay for psychotherapy will result in
the loss of a complete cloak of secrecy for the relationship.47
2. The absence of a privilege delays people from seeking therapy.
For the same reasons described within subsection 1, the presence of a
privilege offers no additional protection for the person who is worried that his
status as a patient of a psychotherapist will be known.
3. The absence of a privilege impairs the quality of therapy.
This premise assumes that without full disclosure by the patient, success-
ful psychotherapy cannot take place and that this full disclosure cannot occur
without the privilege. Crucial to this theory is the assumption that when full
disclosure occurs, psychotherapy is reasonably effective in resolving mental or
emotional problems. There is substantial debate on this point, and no general-
ization is possible at present. One reviewer concludes that "[t]he record sug-
gests that some forms of therapy can lay an undisputed claim to efficacy in
treating mental illness. The evidence is strong, for example, that people suffer-
ing from nonpsychotic depression or moderate anxieties may be helped. But
beyond generalizations of that kind, little has been demonstrated in a way that
satisfies the demand for hard scientific proof of effectiveness." 48
45. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 504[05], at 504-23 (1981). The argi-
ment turns upon the assumption that "In]on-divulgence of a patient's identity may be essential for
maintaining the psychotherapist-patient relationship." Id. But see Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
5561h § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982); Ex parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255 (rex. 1981) (limiting the dis-
closure of the identity of those patients of a psychotherapist who had sexual relations with the
therapist).
46. Although this question will normally be determined by the judge who can, through pro-
tective devices, limit public disclosure (see Fed. R_ Evid. 104(a) & (c)), some degree of disclosure,
if only to the judge and attorneys, will be required.
47. Although many patients in psychotherapy do not use their medical insurance for fear of
revealing that they are in therapy, it is thought that the majority of patients in psychotherapy do
use their medical insurance. See Begler, Privacy and Confidentiality, in Law and Ethics in the
Practice of Psychiatry (C. Hoflind ed. 1980).
48. Marshall, Psychotherapy Works, But for Whom?, 207 Sci. 506, 508 (1980). See also G.
Glass, T. Miller & M. Smith, The Benefits of Psychotherapy (1980). Critics of psychotherapy
question the scientific basis for Freud's psychological theories and point to the studies which con-
clude that genetically triggered bio-chemical factors rather than psychological factors determine
mental illness. If these theorists are correct, psychotherapy is unlikely to be effective for individu-
1982]
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The theoretical model upon which the third premise rests is drawn from
the Freudian school of thought. There are now, however, well over a hundred
schools of psychotherapy. These schools and their corresponding therapies
include psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic psychotherapy, behavior therapy, hyp-
nosis, group psychotherapy, psychodrama, family therapy, marital therapy,
transactional analysis, gestalt therapy, reality therapy, rational-emotive ther-
apy, cognitive therapy and logotherapy,49 to name a few.
Psychoanalysis, the only type of psychotherapy that requires total self-
disclosure by the patient,50 is not the most common type of psychotherapy.
Because of the long period of training, psychoanalysts are few in number.
And because, for a variety of reasons, people do not involve themselves in a
therapy that may require four to five sessions per week for four to seven (or
even more) years, only a small percentage of people with emotional problems
are treated by psychoanalysis.51 Most psychotherapy done outside of psychi-
atric institutions is done once a week and does not require full disclosure of all
aspects of the patient's life, thoughts, feelings and behavior.
Many forms of psychotherapy require that the therapist and patient deal
primarily with the disturbing symptoms and actively attempt to exclude other
aspects of the patient's life from consideration.52 Gestalt therapy, for example,
focuses on the "here and now" of the patient's awareness of external stimuli
during therapy, thus not requiring total disclosure of the patient's innermost
fears and fantasies.53
Confidentiality is necessarily violated in many forms of psychotherapy
that require the inclusion of others as part of the treatment. Family therapy,
couples therapy and group therapy are examples of this type of treatment.
Family therapists find that opening up certain family secrets for discussion
contributes significantly to the well-being of the entire family.54 In psychiatric
hospitals, personal information about the patient deemed important in the
treatment process is shared with the professional members of the treatment
team.
Not all people in psychotherapy seek to avoid public disclosure; some
people are thought to disclose information as a "cry for help" with the hope
that others will intercede.55 Other people in analysis seem to view their treat-
ment as a status symbol 56
als whose mental illness results from their genetic coding rather than repressed conflicts from early
childhood. M. Gross, The Psychological Society 93-141, 195-231 (1978).
49. See Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, supra note 19, at 2113-2256.
50. See Plaut, supra note 22.
51. Indeed, only twenty percent of the money for mental health care in the United States is
spent on the psychotherapies, of which psychoanalysis is but one. The remainder is spent on other
therapies such as hospitalization, chemotherapy, electroshock therapy and psychosurgery, which
do not require candid disclosure of confidential communications. See Marshall, supra note 45.
52. See Weiner, The Psychotherapeutic Impasse, 35 Dis. Nerv. Sys. 259 (1974).
53. Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, supra note 19, at 2238.
54. L Glick & D. Kessler, Marital and Family Therapy 308 (2d ed. 1980).
55. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 8, at 1039-40.
56. M. Gross, supra note 48, at 147.
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Although many psychotherapists stress that confidentiality is at the core
of the relationship between patient and therapist, most are not of the opinion
that it should be absolute.5 7 Peer review, supervision and teaching seminars
all involve discussion of cases. In many instances not all hints of the patient's
true identity can be concealed.5 8 Indeed, the Model Law on Confidentiality of
Health and Social Service Records proposed by the American Psychiatric As-
sociation 59 provides for numerous instances in which a patient's records may
be disclosed without his consent. 60 This proposed law would permit disclosure,
for example, to auditors and surveyors, clinical supervisors and trainers, and
in cases of child abuse or civil commitment.61
4. The absence of a privilege causes premature termination of
therapy.
This premise assumes that the therapist's disclosure of confidential patient
communications will destroy the trust necessary for an effective relationship,
causing its premature termination. Here, again, it is noteworthy that psycho-
therapists have not generally advocated an absolute privilege.62 Instead, they
have recognized a panoply of circumstances in which disclosure should occur
without the patient's consent. Psychotherapists' recognition that the privilege
should not be absolute implies either that therapists do not think that disclo-
sure without the patient's consent will result in premature termination of the
relationship or that they recognize concerns in society more important than
those protected by the privilege.
5. The absence of a privilege leads to compelled judicial disclosure of
patient communications, which results in psychological
harm to patients.
The operating assumption underlying this premise is that the disclosure
that will occur in the absence of a privilege is psychologically harmful to pa-
tients. Again, the various exceptions to the privilege proposed by psychothera-
pists weaken this argument. Either they question the likelihood of
psychological harm in the event of disclosure or they conclude that it is out-
weighed by the harm that would flow from nondisclosure. In either case the
theoretical argument in favor of the privilege is weakened.
Thus, the theoretical justifications for the psychotherapist-patient privi-
57. Uchill, supra note 23, at 208.
58. Lowenthal, The Vicissitudes of Discretion in Psychotherapy, 28 Am. J. Psychotherapy
235 (1975).
59. 136 Am. J. Psychiatry 138 (1979).
60. The Model Law on Confidentiality of Health and Social Science Records permits disclo-
sure of confidential information without patient consent to clinical supervisors, auditors, and fel-
low employees or to protect an abused child or commit a patient.
61. For a discussion of the wisdom of excepting the privilege in civil commitment proceed-
ings, see Shuman, The Road to Bedlam: Evidentiary Guideposts in Civil Commitment Proceed-
ings, 55 Notre Dame Law. 53, 69-71 (1979).
62. See note 60 supra.
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lege are not as sound as they appear on the surface. Upon this questionable
foundation is constructed the body of law that supports the existence of this
privilege.
C The Law of Privilege
Accurate knowledge of some past event is frequently necessary to decide
correctly the issues in judicial proceedings that hold the potential for loss of
life, liberty or property. However, once an event has occurred, any attempt to
acquire "unassailably accurate knowledge" of that event in a judicial proceed-
ing will necessarily fail. Instead, the best that might be expected is to acquire
knowledge of what probably happened. 63 Because knowledge of what proba-
bly happened is likely to increase as more relevant evidence is introduced,
rational systems of evidence are structured to accept all relevant evidence un-
less there is a strong policy justifying its exclusion."
One use of this policy justifying exclusion of relevant evidence is the crea-
tion of relational privileges. A variety of relationships including, inter alia,
attorney-client, 65 priest-penitant, 66 husband-wife67 and physician-patient 68
have been accorded an evidentiary privilege in various jurisdictions, thereby
limiting these relational communications as a source of evidence in judicial
proceedings. The creation of these privileges had its origin in the history of
trials at common law.
In England, prior to the 1400s, the jury served both as trier and witness. 69
The use of other witnesses, as we now think of witnesses, was uncommon.70
Persons who sought to give testimony as ordinary witnesses were unwelcome,
were viewed as meddlers and were subject to suit for maintenance, supporting
the litigation of another.71 Gradually, the inadequacy of this method of trial,
which "turned more on argument than fact," 72 was recognized and the efforts
against it culminated in 1562-63 in the Statute of Elizabeth.73 This Statute
imposed penalties for refusal to attend as a witness after service of process and
tender of expenses, did away with the threat of suit for maintenance74 and
paved the way for the concept of the duty of a witness to give evidence-the
"fundamental maxim that the public ... has a right to everyman's
evidence. '" 75
63. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
64. J. Thayer, A Preliinary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 530 (1898).
65. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2290.
66. Id. § 2394.
67. Id. § 2332.
68. Id. § 2380.
69. Id. § 2190, at 62.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 63-64.
72. R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modem Approach to Evidence 608 (1977).
73. 8 J. Wigmnore, supra note 2, § 2190, at 65.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 2192, at 70.
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Prior to the Statute of Elizabeth, little need existed for the concept of
privilege in common-law trials.76 After the possibility of testimonial compul-
sion existed in common-law trials, the concept of privilege developed in the
1600s. Originally privilege existed as a notion of honor among gentlemen.77
This was later transformed into an attorney-client privilege, the oldest rela-
tional privilege, 78 based upon the "honorable obligation" of the attorney
rather than any need for a privilege to protect the attorney-client relation-
ship.79 Professor Wigmore contends 80 that the "honor among gentlemen" ra-
tionale for privileges was abandoned in 1776 in the famous Duchess of
Kingston's Case,81 which refused to recognize a physician-patient privilege
based upon the physician's honor. Thereafter, Professor Wigmore suggests, a
more stringent, utilitarian basis was required to recognize a privilege.8 2 In the
case of the attorney-client privilege--the only privilege recognized at common
law-it was theorized that the privilege was necessary because attorneys could
represent clients effectively only if they knew all the facts available to the cli-
ent and that the client would not reveal these facts if the lawyer could be
forced to reveal them in court.83
Professor Wigmore's articulation of the more stringent basis required to
support a privilege is found in his own four requirements, according to which
proposed privileges should be measured:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the commu-
nity ought to be sedulouslyfostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the beneft thereby
gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.84
These criteria have come to be accepted by most evidence scholars as the ap-
propriate test for any proposed privilege. 85
76. Id. § 2290, at 542-43.
77. Id. § 2286, at 530-31.
78. Id. § 2290, at 542.
79. Id. § 2286, at 530-31.
80. Id.
81. 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776). In 1776 the Duchess was tried, before the House of Lords, for
bigamy. To prove the existence of her first marriage, the Crown sought the testimony of a physi-
cian who had attended the Duchess and to whom she had admitted the first marriage. Lord Mans-
field's response to the physician's request for clarification of his obligation to keep these
communications secret is the oft quoted common-law refusal to recognize a physician-patient
privilege: "If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be guilty of a
breach of honour and of great indiscretion; but to give that information in a court ofjustice, which
by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion
whatever." Id. at 573.
82. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2286, at 531.
83. Id. §§ 2290-2291.
84. Id. § 2285, at 527.
85. R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 72, at 615.
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However, other respected evidence scholars disagree with Professor Wig-
more that the practical justification is now, or ever was, the test for privilege.8 6
These scholars, led by David Louisell, have argued that privileges protect "sig-
nificant human values in the interest of the holders of the privilege and that
the fact that the existence of these guarantees sometimes results in the exclu-
sion from a trial of probative evidence is merely a secondary and incidental
feature of the privilege's vitality."87 This noninstrumenta 88 view rests upon
the conclusion that personal privacy, which encompasses the power to control
dissemination of information about oneself, is so important that it should not
be curtailed by a limit on testimonial privileges. 89 Supporting this conclusion
are the social goals in our democracy furthered by this notion of privacy: pri-
vacy facilitates the personal autonomy necessary for the development of indi-
viduality;90 privacy permits an emotional release outside the bounds of "our
carefully controlled public etiquette";91 privacy permits self-evaluation of ex-
periences as against personal codes; 92 privacy permits confidential
communications. 93
The choice between the instrumental versus noninstrumental support for
relational privileges is not mutually exclusive. Both rationales have been used
to justify the same privileges. 94 Moreover, it is not at all clear that those two
approaches, which differ so in theory, differ markedly in their application.
Consider the case of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The instrumental justification for the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
that it is essential for effective psychotherapy and that goal is more important
than that of accurate fact finding in judicial proceedings. The noninstru-
mental justification for the privilege is that the right to control the dissemina-
tion of personal information communicated to a psychotherapist furthers
important social goals. Because the noninstrumentalists do not contend that
the privilege should be absolute, they must balance the goals furthered by the
privilege against another social goal-accuracy in judicial proceedings. Both
justifications raise empirical questions:95 Do patients contemplating psycho-
therapy consider the privilege in their decision to institute therapy? Are peo-
ple thwarted by an absence of privilege in their attempts to develop
individuality? Both justifications require a balance that ultimately cannot be
86. Krattenmacker, supra note 31, at 85; Louisell, supra note 2. However, judicial scrutiny of
proposed privileges typically utilizes Wigmore's criteria. See, e.g., In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 22-
3 (st Cir. 1981); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971).
87. Louisell, supra note 2, at 101.
88. See 23 C. Wright & M. Graham, supra note 32, § 5422, at 671.
89. Krattenmacker, supra note 31, at 86-87.
90. Id. at 87.
91. Id. at 87-88.
92. Id. at 88.
93. Id.
94. 23 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 32, § 5422, at 672.
95. Professors Wright and Graham disagree with this proposition. Id. at 672-73. They con-
tend that the instrumental justifications for privilege are subject to empirical scrutiny while the
noninstrumental justifications are not.
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resolved empirically: Given the need for the privilege in therapy or for the
development of individuality, which should society value as more important,
that need or accurate factfinding in judicial proceedings?
Although both instrumentalists and noninstrumentalists have supported a
psychotherapist-patient privilege,96 the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and the California Evidence Code used an exclusively utilitarian justifi-
cation for their proposed psychotherapist-patient privilege.97 And, although
instrumentalists and noninstrumentalists have failed to provide empirical sup-
port for the privilege, they have persuaded every state legislature but two to
abrogate the common law, which did not recognize a physician-patient or psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege.98 Legislative abrogation began in 1828 with the
passage of the first physician-patient privilege in New York.99 At present
forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted a physician-patient
privilege and all but two-South Carolina and West Virginia-have enacted
either a physician-patient, psychiatrist-patient, psychologist-patient or psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. '(
Although these privilege statutes vary widely, they tend to have certain
96. See articles cited-at notes 4 & 86 supra.
97. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504 advisory committee note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 242
(1973); Cal. Evid. Code § 1014, Senate Comm. on Judiciary comments (West 1966).
98. See Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 335, 573 (1776). See also Note, Confi-
dential Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New Testimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev.
384 (1952). But see Allred v. State, 554 .2d 411, 416-18 (Alaska 1976).
99. C. DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient 15 (1958).
100. The following table describes this pattern:
PHYSICIAN-. PSYCHIATRIST- PSYCHOLOGIST- PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT PATIENT PATIENT .PATIENT
STATE PRIVILEGE PRIVILEGE PRIVILEGE . PRIVILEGE
Alabama Yes Yes
Ala. Code § 34- Ala. Code § 34-26-
26-2 (Supp. 1981) 2 (Supp. 1981)
Alaska Yes
Alaska R.
Civ. P.
§ 43(h)(4)
(Supp. 1966)
Arizona Yes
Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann.
§ 12-2235
(1982)
Arkansas Yes
Ark. Stat.
Ann. §28-
1001, Unif.
R. Evid. 503
(1979)
California Yes
Cal. Evid.
Code §§ 990-
1007 (West
1966 & Supp.
1981)
Yes
Cal. Evid. Code
§§ 1010-1026
(West Supp. 1981)
Yes
Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 32-2085
(Supp. 1981)
Yes
Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1001, Uni: R.
Evid. 503 (1979)
Yes
Cal. Evid. Code
1010-1026 (West
Supp. 1981)
Yes
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-
1001, Unif R. Evid.
503 (1979)
Yes
Cal. Evid. Code
§§ 1010-1026 (West
Supp. 1981)
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features in common. Application of the privileges requires that a person con-
sult one whom he reasonably believes to be a physician or psychotherapist for
PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT
STATE PRIVILEGE
Colorado Yes
Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-90-
107(d) (1973)
Connecticut
Delaware
PSYCHIATRIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
Yes
Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 52-146(d)
(West Supp. 1981)
Yes
DeL Unif. R.
Evid. 503
(1981)
District of Yes
Columbia D.C. Code
Ann. § 14-307
(1981)
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Yes
Ga. Code
Ann. § 38-
418(b) (1981)
Yes
Hawaii Rev.
Stat. § 621-1,
Hawaii R.
Evid. 503
(Supp. 1980)
Yes
Idaho Code
§ 9-203.4
(Supp. 1981)
Yes
I. Rev. Stat.
ch. 51, §5.1
(1966)
Yes
Ind. Code
§ 34-1-14-5
(Supp. 1980)
Yes
Iowa Code
Ann. § 622.10
(Supp. 1981)
Yes
Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 90.503 (West
1979)
Yes
Ga. Code Ann.
§ 38-418(a)5.
(1981)
PSYCHOLOGIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
Yes
Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-90-107(g)
(1973)
Yes
Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 52-146(c)
(West Supp. 1981)
Yes
Del. Unif. R. Evid.
503 (1981)
Yes
D.C. Code Ann.
§ 2-1704.16 (1981)
Yes
Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 90.503 (West
1979)
Yes
Ga. Code Ann.
§ 84-3118 (1981)
Yes
Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 621-1, Hawaii R.
Evid. 503 (Supp.
1980)
Yes
Idaho Code § 54-
2314 (1979)
Yes
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
111, § 5306 (Smith-
Hurd 1978 &
Supp. 1981)
Yes
Ind. Code § 25-33-
1-17 (1974)
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
Yes
Del. Unif. R. Evid. 503
(1981)
Yes
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.503
(West 1979)
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PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT
STATE PRIVILEGE
Kansas Yes
Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 60-427
(1976)
Kentucky
Louisiana Yes
La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 15:476
(West 1981)
Maine Yes
Me. R. Evid.
503
Maryland
Massachusetts
PSYCHIATRIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
Yes
Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 421.215 (1970)
Yes
Md. Cts. & Judic.
Proc. Ann. § 9-
109 (1980)
PSYCHOLOGIST- PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT PATIENT
PRIVILEGE PRIVILEGE
Yes
Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 74-5323 (1980)
Yes
Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 319.111 (1977)
Yes
La. Rev. Stat.§ 37:2366 (West
1974)
Yes
Me. R. Evid. 503
Yes
Md. Cts. & Judic.
Proc. Ann. § 9-109
(1980)
Yes
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 233, § 20B (West
1974)
Michigan Yes
Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann.
§ 600.2157
(1980)
Minnesota Yes
Minn. Stat.
Ann.
§ 595.02(4)
(West Supp.
1981)
Mississippi Yes
Miss. Code
Ann. § 13-1-
21 (Cune.
Supp. 1981)
Missouri Yes
Mo. Ann.
Stat.§ 491.060(5)
(Vernon
Supp. 1982)
Montana Yes
Mont. Rev.
Code Ann.
§ 26-1-805
(1979)
Yes
Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 333.18401
(1980)
Yes
Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 595.02(7) (West
Supp. 1981)
Yes
Miss. Code Ann.
§ 73-31-29 (Cum.
Supp. 1981)
Yes
Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 337.055 (Vernon
Supp. 1982)
Yes
Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. § 25-1-807
(1979)
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PHYSICIAN- PSYCHIATRIST-
PATIENT PATIENT
STATE PRIVILEGE PRIVILEGE
Nebraska Yes
Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 27-504
(1979)
Nevada Yes
Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 49.215
(1979)
New Yes
Hampshire N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann.
§ 329:26
(Supp. 1981)
New Jersey Yes
N.J. Rev.
Stat.
§ 2A:84A-
22.2 (1976)
PSYCHOLOGIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
Yes
Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§ 49.215, .225
(1979)
Yes
N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 330 A.19
(Supp. 1981)
Yes
N.J. Rev. Stat.
§ 45:14B-28 (1978)
New Mexico
New York Yes
N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Law§ 4504
(McKinney
Supp. 1981)
North Yes
Carolina N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 8-53
(1981)
North Yes
Dakota N.D.R. Evid.
503 (Supp.
1981)
Ohio Yes
Ohio Rev.
Code Ann.
§ 2317.02(B)
(Page 1981)
Oklahoma Yes
Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12,
§ 2503 (West
Supp. 1981)
Oregon
Yes
N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 61-9-18 (1978) &
N.M.R. Evid. 504
(1978)
Yes
N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Law § 4507
(McKinney Supp.
1981)
Yes
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 8-53.3 (1981)
Yes
N.M.R. Evid. 504
(1978)
Yes
N.D.R. Evid. 503
(Supp. 1981)
Yes
Okla. Stat. Ann.
. tit. 12, § 2503
(West Supp. 1981)
Yes
Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 44.040(d)
(1979)
Pennsylvania Yes
Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann.
§ 5929
(Purdon
Supp. 1981)
Yes
Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 4732.19
(Page 1981)
Yes
Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 2503
(West Supp. 1981)
Yes
Or. Rev. Stat.
44.040(h) (1979)
Yes
Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 5944
(Purdon Supp.
1981)
Yes
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
§ 2503 (West Supp.
1981)
Yes
Or. Rev. Stat.§§ 44.040(h) (1979) &
675.010 (Supp. 1981)
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PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT
STATE PRIVILEGE
Rhode Island Yes
R.I. Gen.
Laws § 5-
37.3-4 (Cum.
Supp. 1981)
South
Carolina
South Dakota Yes
S.D. Codified
Laws Ann.
§§ 19-13-6 to
-11 (1979)
PSYCHIATRIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
PSYCHOLOGIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
Yes
R.I. Gen, Laws
6 5-37.3-4 (Cum.
Supp. 1981)
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
Yes
S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. §§ 19-13-6 to -11
(1979)
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Yes
Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 24-1-207 (1980)
Yes
Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat.
Ann. art.
4495b, § 5.08
(Vernon
Supp. 1982)
Yes
Utah Code
Ann. § 78-24-
8(d) (1977)
Vermont Yes
Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 1612
(Supp. 1980)
Virginia Yes
Va. Code
Ann. § 8.01-
399 (1977)
Washington Yes
Wash. Rev.
Code Ann.
§ 5.60.060(4)
(Supp. 1981)
West Virginia
Wisconsin Yes
Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 905.04
(West Supp.
1980)
Wyoming Yes
Wyo. Stat.§ 1-12-
101(a)(i)
(1977)
Yes
Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 63-1117 (1976)
Yes
Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art.
5561h (Vernon
Supp. 1982)
Yes
Utah Code Ann,
§ 58-25-8 (Supp.
1979)
Yes
Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-399 (1977)
Yes
Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 18.83.110
(1978)
Yes
Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 905.04 (West
Supp. 1980)
Yes
Wyo. Stat. § 33-27-
103 (1977)
Yes
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 5561h
(Vernon Supp. 1982)
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the purpose of treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment. 101 For
example, examinations to prepare for judicial testimony or as a prerequisite
for employment are outside the privilege. 102 The information communicated
to the physician or psychotherapist must be intended to be confidential and
must bear upon treatment.' 03 For example, communications made in the
presence of nonessential third persons or solely for social purposes are outside
the privilege.
Although all but two states have enacted some form of physician-patient,
psychiatrist-patient, psychologist-patient or psychotherapist-patient privilege,
the legal effect of these statutes is neutralized by the many exceptions that
exist. 1' 4 Many states do not apply the privilege in criminal cases,105 civil com-
mitment proceedings' °6 or worker's compensation proceedings. 107 Other
states reject the privilege in personal injury proceedings brought by the pa-
tient,108 will contests' 9 or child abuse proceedings.1'0 Still other states' stat-
utes provide that the judge may permit an exception to the privilege when
necessary for the proper administration of justice. 1" Thus, the existence of a
privilege, if known by a patient, provides a false sense of security against com-
pelled judicial disclosure.
The concept of confidentiality must be distinguished from the law of priv-
ilege. An evidentiary privilege is a law that permits a person to prevent a
court from requiring revelation of relational communications. Confidentiality
refers to a duty, frequently an ethical limitation imposed by a profession, not
to disclose relational communications. 1 2 These ethical limitations prohibit
gratuitous disclosure of patient communications-for example, to one's spouse
or friend. Thus, they provide substantial assurances that, in the ordinary
course of events, nothing told to one's therapist will be disclosed to others. But
they do not abrogate the duty to respond to compulsory judicial process. 13
101. C. McCormick, supra note 44, § 99, at 213.
102. See id. at 214.
103. Id. §§ 100-101.
104. Shuman, supra note 61, at 61.
105. E.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 44.040(d) (1979); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060(4) (Supp. 1981).
106. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146f(b) (West Supp. 1981); Del. Uniform R. Evid. 503(d)(1)
(1981).
107. "More than half the states which have the privilege provide that it shall not apply in
Workmen's Compensation proceedings." C. McCormick, supra note 41, § 104, at 223 n.77.
108. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1016 (West 1966); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146d(e) (West
1981).
109. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1022 (West 1966); NJ. Rev. Stat. § 2A:84A-22.3 (1976).
110. Cal. Evid. Code § 1027 (West Supp. 1981); Del. Uniform R. Evid. 503(d)(4) (1981); Idaho
Code § 9-203.4(A) (Supp. 1981).
111. E.g., Va. Code § 8.01-399 (1977).
112. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct, comments to rule 1.7 (ABA) (discussion
draft 1980) ("Two sets of rules govern disclosure by a lawyer of information concerning his client.
One is the law of evidentiary privilege. The other, which may be called the rule of client-lawyer
confidentiality, is a professional rule that information concerning a client must in general be kept
confidential.").
. 113. The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry,
§ 9, 130 Am. J. Psychiatry 1058, 1059 (1973) specifically excepts disclosures required by law: "The
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The privilege provides the patient with the opportunity to prevent his
therapist from testifying about their confidential communications. Therein
lies the heart of the opposition to the privilege. Even if the communications
are highly relevant, and even if the communications are the only source of
information on a crucial issue in a lawsuit, the patient may invoke an applica-
ble privilege and prevent the therapist from disclosing this information. The
factfinder may then be left with an erroneous picture of some critical occur-
rence and therefore decide the case wrongly.
The objections to the privilege rest upon the assumption that, in a reason-
able number of cases, relevant information is known only to the therapist and
is not available through nonprivileged sources. In addition, these objections
assume that this information, made unavailable because of the privilege,
would change the outcome of the litigation. These assumptions will be ex-
amined in light of the judicial study in part IV.
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES
No empirical study supporting or opposing a physician-patient or psycho-
therapist-patient privilege is cited by any of the drafters of privilege statutes in
support of these statutes.1 14 Instead, we are left to believe that legislative deci-
sions on the privilege are a testament to effective lobbying and not the result of
informed decision-making. There are, however, studies in the legal and scien-
tific journals that merit examination.
4. Studies Reported in Legal Journals
In 1962, the Yale Law Journal published a student Comment entitled
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals.l15 The Com-
ment reported a questionnaire study by the Journal of 35 psychotherapists, 51
psychologists, 25 marriage counselors, 125 lawyers, 47 judges and 108 lay peo-
ple. Seventy-one percent of the lay people questioned reported that they
would be less likely to make "free and complete disclosure" to a psychiatrist,
psychologist, marriage counselor, or social worker if that person had a legal
obligation to disclose confidential information if asked to do so by a lawyer in
physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance, or
the deficiencies he may observe in the character of his patients, unless he is required to do so by
law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the
community."
Principle 6 of the Ethical Standards of Psychologists, which describes the duty of a psycholo-
gist to maintain the confidences of a patient (see 18 Am. J. Psychiatry 56 (1963)), contains no
express reference to disclosures required by law. Although a private organization may impose
obligations upon its members, it cannot, as a private entity, contravene the obligations of its mem-
bers as defined by the courts or legislature.
114. See note 9 supra.
115. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Impli-
cations for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962).
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court." 6 Thirty-one percent of this group had sought counseling at some
point in time.' 7 Although the high percentage of lay people who would hesi-
tate to disclose fully without some protection argues in favor of the privilege,
there is a flaw in this conclusion. The questionnaire informed the lay people
of the possibility, if not the probability, of judicial disclosure. This assumes
away the major question: Do people contemplate the possibility of judicial
disclosure and accurately evaluate the effect of the privilege prior to communi-
cating with a therapist? If people are not cogiizant of the privilege and its
operation-if people do not contemplate the possibility of judicial disclo-
sure-the privilege cannot provide the inducement to candid discussions its
proponents claim. In a similar vein, the questionnaire did not ask those lay
people who had consulted a psychiatrist or psychologist whether they consid-
ered the privilege or its absence and the possibility ofjudicial disclosure prior
to communicating with their therapists.
Forty-three percent of the psychiatrists and thirty-three percent of the
psychologists surveyed had been called upon to testify in court about present
or past patients; however, only three psychiatrists and six psychologists had
been asked to disclose confidential information. 81 Thus, for the psychiatrists
and psychologists surveyed and their patients, the legal effect of a privilege
would have been minimal; the issue rarely arose in the courts.
The psychiatrists and psychologists surveyed agreed that the privilege was
desirable. 19 However, the answers to the question fail to explain whether the
psychiatrists and psychologists merely dislike the inconvenience of testifying
or have a more substantial basis for their conclusion.
It is significant that none of the judges surveyed, and few of the lawyers,
found the privilege disruptive of the trial process.120 However, nearly one-
third of the lawyers polled stated that the privilege excluded information un-
available from nonprivileged sources.12'
, In 1976 the Supreme Court of California decided Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of Calffornia,122 in which it held that therapists owe a duty to
use reasonable care to protect persons threatened by their patients. The deci-
sion was greeted by psychotherapists with prophecies of doom; they predicted
that it would result in the destruction of trust between therapist and patient
and thus preclude effective therapy.'2 One year after the Tarasoff decision,
116. Id. at 1255.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1256 nn.192 & 196.
119. Id. at 1256 nn.204-05.
120. Id. at 1261 n.233.
121. Id. at 1261.
122. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
123. Gurevit7, Tarasoff. Protective Privilege versus Public Peril, 134 Am. J. Psychiatry 289
(1977); Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 358 (1976). But see Wexler, Patients, Therapists and Third Parties: The Victimological Vir-
tues of Tarasoff, 2 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry (1979) (arguing that the Tarasoffcourt may have, unwit-
tingly, encouraged therapists to use couples or conjoint therapies suggested by the literature on
victimology but rejected by psychoanalytically oriented therapists).
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the Stanford Law Review conducted an empirical survey of California ther-
apists to ascertain the effects of Tarasoff.124
The survey consisted of a mail questionnaire completed by 179 psycholo-
gists and 1,093 psychiatrists.12 5 Respondents in the study had a mean age of
forty-five years, had been in practice for fourteen years, and a majority were
psychoanalytically oriented. 126 These therapists treated an average of 240 pa-
tients each year.127 More than eighty percent reported seeing at least one po-
tentially dangerous patient each year.128
Seventy-nine percent of the therapists responded that, in their opinion,
their patients would feel inhibited if they knew that their communications
were not governed by strict confidentiality. 129 However, the majority thought
that it was sometimes proper to breach confidentiality. 130 Only eleven percent
always discussed confidentiality with patients; a majority did so
occasionally. 131
Nearly one-quarter of the therapists observed some reluctance of patients
to discuss violent tendencies once told that a loss of confidentiality might oc-
cur. 132 One-quarter of the therapists reported losing patients because the pa-
tients feared a breach of confidentiality.' 33 Twenty-three percent of the
therapists said their patients refused further treatment, and eleven percent said
the patient returned to treatment or was successfully referred to someone
else.' 34 Sixty-three percent did not know what happened to the patient.135
The Tarasoff decision, with its conditional abrogation of confidentiality,
did not result in the destruction of effective therapeutic relationships as its
critics had prophesied. Even prior to Tarasoff therapists had warned persons
threatened by their patients.' 36 Tarasoff did, however, increase the frequency
with which dangerousness and confidentiality were discussed in therapy,
thereby altering the therapeutic dialogue. 137
B. Studies Reported in ScientYc Journals
Two articles in the scientific literature report studies that are of interest to
those studying the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Massachusetts Psychiatry
124. Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the
Effects of Tarasoff, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 165 (1978).
125. Id. at 174.
126. Id. at 175.
127. Id. at 175-76.
128. Id. at 176.
129. Id. at 176 n.63.
130. Id. at 176 n.65.
131. Id. at 176.
132. Id. at 177.
133. Id. at 177 n.67. Therapists reporting losses due to patients' fears of a breach of confiden-
tiality lost a median of three patients.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 178-79 n.74.
137. Id. at 187.
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and Privileged Communications138 describes a 1966 questionnaire study of
Massachusetts psychiatrists. Sixty-three percent of Massachusetts' 814 psychi-
atrists responded. 139 One-quarter of the respondents were not aware that
Massachusetts lacked an applicable privilege, although ninety-two percent fa-
vored a privilege with a variety of exceptions. 140 Twenty-eight percent said
that in at least one case in the past five years privilege had been a significant
factor; however, in response to a request for illustrative cases, only nine cases
were cited in which psychiatric records were obtained involuntarily.' 41
This study, like the Yale study, suggests that even in the absence of a
privilege most therapists are never faced with compelled judicial disclosure of
confidential patient communications. And, for the few who are, the situation
occurs quite rarely, thus limiting the legal effect of a privilege.
The second study, Informed Consent: Consequencesfor Response Rate and
Response Quality in Social Surveys, 142 was designed to discern the effects of
informed consent in social science research and the consequences of assuring
confidentiality to respondents. The respondents were asked a series of ques-
tions involving nonsensitive and sensitive matters such as marijuana use and
sexual behavior. One-third were told their responses were protected by abso-
lute confidentiality, one-third were told their responses were protected by
qualified assurances of confidentiality and one-third were not told anything
about confidentiality. 143
The assurance of confidentiality had no statistically significant effect on
response rate in general. However, it did have a small effect on the response
rate for some of the sensitive questions. 144 For example, when asked if they
ever smoked marijuana more than three times a week, the non-response rates
for those assured of absolute confidentiality was 3.1 percent, 145 considerably
less than the non-response rate for those to whom confidentiality was not men-
tioned (7.5 percent), and the non-response rate for those given qualified assur-
ance of confidentiality (10.6 percent).' 46
These studies are informative but leave a number of important questions
unanswered. For example, these studies suggest that people alerted to the risk
of compelled judicial disclosure in the absence of a privilege are less likely to
disclose fully, but do not indicate whether patients consider the possibility of
compelled judicial disclosure or the existence and scope of protection a privi-
lege provides before seeking therapy or making disclosures in therapy. Are
patients aware of whether their state recognizes a privilege? If not, how can
138. Suarez & Balcanoff, Massachusetts Psychiatry and Privileged Communications, 15
Archives Gen. Psychiatry 619 (1966).
139. Id. at 620.
140. Id. at 621.
141. Id. at 623.
142. Singer, Informed Consent: Consequences for Response Rate and Response Quality in
Social Surveys, 43 Am. Soc. Rev. 144 (1978).
143. Id. at 146.
144. Id. at 149, 151.
145. Id. at 151.
146. Id.
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the lack of a privilege deter or delay people from seeking therapy or affect
their disclosures in therapy? Are patients psychologically harmed by disclo-
sure of their confidential communications; do they terminate therapy when
this occurs? To answer these questions, this study was undertaken.
IV. THE PRIVILEGE STUDY
.4 Methodology
Prompted by the absence of empirical evidence on the critical questions
underlying the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and the passage of a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege statute in Texas in 1979, we undertook this study.
Because of the inherent limitations on social science research, 147 we sought a
number of different windows on the questions before us.
Proponents of the privilege contend that the lack of privilege deters or
delays people from seeking therapy. If so, the existence of a privilege should
avoid this deterrence or delay and result in more people seeking therapy. To
study this question we obtained data on claims from Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of Texas for the years preceding and following passage of the privilege, and
sought to determine whether there was a change in claims for psychotherapy
over this time that might be attributable to the passage of the privilege statute.
Proponents of the privilege contend that the absence of a privilege deters
or delays therapy and impairs the quality of therapy. If so, people who con-
template therapy must know of the privilege's status in their state and consider
that in their decision to institute therapy and to make disclosures in therapy.
To study this question we sampled a group of patients in therapy and a group
of lay people.
The lay questionnaire was distributed at evening adult education classes
at a nearby university. Students were told by their instructors that the ques-
tionnaire was a survey on privileged communications, that the respondents'
names were not known to the investigators, and that students were free not to
participate. Of the 200 questionnaires distributed, 121 were returned to the
instructor at the end of the class.
The patient questionnaire was distributed by thirty-one psychiatrists who
agreed to give at least five questionnaires each to patients in therapy, to ex-
plain that the questionnaire was part of a research project, that the respon-
dent's names were not known to the investigators and that patients were free
not to participate. Fifty percent of the 160 questionnaires distributed were
returned.
Proponents of the privilege contend that the lack of privilege results in
premature termination of therapy and psychologically harmful judicial disclo-
sures. If so, therapists should have been judicially compelled to reveal confi-
147. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 33 (1966). In the ideal research project, only
one parameter is varied at a time. Unfortunately, in social science research this possibility does
not exist; therefore, it is useful to develop more than one measurement technique to verify any
conclusions.
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dential communication resulting in premature termination of therapy and
psychological harm to patients during the years in which no psychotherapist-
patient privilege existed in Texas. To study this, we questioned therapists. The
therapist questionnaire was sent to the 186 members of the North Texas Psy-
chiatric Society. Eighty-four of the questionnaires were returned.
Opponents of the privilege contend that it results in the exclusion of rele-
vant evidence rendering judicial proceedings inaccurate. If so, during the
years in which no psychotherapist-patient privilege existed in Texag,'therapists
should have been compelled to reveal confidential communications that were
extremely important in judicial proceedings and contained information not
available from other sources. Conversely, now that the privilege exists in
Texas, courts should be denied extremely important information not available
from nonprivileged sources. To study this question, we surveyed judges. The
judicial questionnaire was administered to forty-eight of the fifty-six state and
federal judges in Dallas County, Texas, with generally unlimited jurisdiction
over civil and criminal cases.
B. Insurance Study
The existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, according to its pro-
ponents, should encourage people to seek psychotherapy because of the veil of
privacy it provides. If this assumption is correct, following the enactment of a
privilege, persons who refrained from seeking psychotherapy because of its
absence will now seek it, resulting in increased numbers of patients in psycho-
therapy. Because a significant percentage of patients receiving psychotherapy
use their medical insurance to pay for therapy, 148 an increase in claims for
psychotherapy should follow the enactment of a privilege.
To test this assumption we obtained data from Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Texas for 1976 through 1980 detailing the number of billings for initial psychi-
atric interviews, one hour psychotherapy, half-hour psychotherapy, forty-five
minute psychotherapy, and one and one-half hour group psychotherapy. 149 If
the assumption described above is correct an increase in intial psychiatric in-
terviews should have occurred following the privilege's passage in 1979, but
the number of services billed for initial psychiatric interviews in 1980 (9,682)
was lower than for 1976 (10,174) or 1977 (10,829) but higher than 1978
(8,560).150 No increase in patients seeking initial psychiatric interviews oc-
curred during the first full year of the privilege's operation.
In 1980 the number of psychotherapy services billed for in one hour in-
crements (41,293) was slightly higher than 1978 (40,753), but a decrease from
1979 (47,873). In light of the vacillations in these figures-39,462 (1976),
148. See note 47 supra.
149. See Table 5, Appendix infra.
150. Id. Because the statute became effective on August 27, 1979 (Act of May 17, 1979, ch.
239, § 7, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 512) and we were unable to obtain monthly breakdowns for 1979,
the data for that year is of limited use in ascertaining the impact of the privilege. Obviously, it
will be useful, after the passage of several years, to reexamine these data.
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35,405 (1977), 40,753 (1978), 47,873 (1979), and 41,293 (1980)-no clear pic-
ture of an increase in one hour psychotherapy sessions is depicted.
Services billed for group and forty-five minute psychotherapy have been
rising, with decided increases in 1980. Group psychotherapy is typically not
within the psychotherapist-patient privilege because of the presence of other
patient-participants.' 5 ' Thus, the rise in group psychotherapy appears attribu-
table to factors other than the privilege.
The increase in psychotherapy services billed for in forty-five minute in-
crements is substantial-4,789 (1977), 6,853 (1978), 9,023 (1979), and 18,581
(1980). Although this increase might be attributable to the passage of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege statute, more likely it and the concomitant linear
decrease in half-hour psychotherapy result from a change in reporting charges
for treatment sessions.152 The most persuasive evidence that no increase in
treatment occurred is the total number of claims for each year, which reveals a
slight downward trend from 1976 through 1980, consistent with the overall
insurance enrollment. 153
C Lay Study
A group of students at evening adult education classes at a nearby univer-
sity was selected to represent persons not currently in therapy for whom the
existence of a privilege might be consequential in entering therapy. 154Ninety-
three percent of this group indicated that they would seek help from a psychia-
trist or psychologist for a serious emotional problem.155 Without any mention
of a privilege, the group was asked if, having sought help, they would disclose
to a therapist a series of subjects including speeding, sexual fantasies, work
failure and income tax evasion, if these subjects were important issues.15 6
They indicated that they would be least likely to disclose information about
masturbation, sexual thoughts and sexual activities. They were then told that
a privilege applied and asked the same question.157 No significant difference
in the response rate occurred. However, when asked whether they would dis-
cuss these subjects in the absence of a privilege, 5 8 the response rate declined
151. Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants and Group Psychotherapy, 1970
Law & Soc. Ord. 191, 193-94. The Texas statute makes no specific reference to group psychother-
apy. One author, however, argues that because communications between a patient and psycho-
therapist are presumed confidential under the Texas statute, confidentiality in fact need not exist,
and group psychotherapy is covered under the Act. Comment, supra note 10, at 161. This issue
has not been addressed by the courts in Texas and it remains to be seen whether the Texas courts
will read into the statute an implicit requirement of confidentiality. When confidentiality ceases,
privilege ceases. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 2, § 2311, at 599.
152. See Table 5, Appendix infra.
153. Although no changes in the scope of coverage occurred during this period, the total
number of persons enrolled did decline slightly. In January 1976, 1,484,161 individuals were en-
rolled with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, and in December 1980, 1,307,778 individuals were
enrolled.
154. See Table 1, Appendix infra.
155. Id. at Question 1.
156. Id. at Question 2.
157. Id. at Question 6.
158. Id. at Question 7.
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markedly. The items most affected by the nonexistence of a privilege had le-
gal consequences-speeding, physical violence, income tax evasion and theft.
People were only slightly less willing to discuss sexual thoughts and acts or
masturbation, the most sensitive items, when told that no privilege existed.
Three-fourths of the group was either unaware of the privilege or thought
none existed; 159 only one-fourth realized that a privilege exists. In addition,
few expressed concern about the risk of disclosure to an insurer, state agency,
potential employer or in a trial setting should they seek therapy.1 60 Thus, for
these people, the absence of a privilege would not delay or deter therapy be-
cause the vast majority were unaware of the privilege's existence and would
not consider the risk of disclosure to third parties in conjunction with therapy.
. Patient Study
Seventy-nine patients in therapy responded to the patient question-
naire. 161 They ranged in age from seventeen to fifty-nine and had a median
age of thity-six with a female-to-male ratio of 3.5:1. They had been in ther-
apy for a "median of three years.'
Only twenty-seven percent of the patients currently in therapy thought
that an applicable privilege exists in Texas; seventy-three percent thought that
no privilege exists or were unaware of the law.'16 2 However, for fifty-four per-
cent, confidentiality was a concern when they first considered therapy. 163
Twenty-eight percent of the patients had asked their therapist about confiden-
tiality; 64 however, only eight percent of the patients said that knowledge of a
privilege statute would have encouraged them to seek treatment earlier. 165 In-
stead, ninety-six percent of these individuals relied more heavily on the thera-
pist's ethics for confidentiality than on a privilege statute.' 66
Forty percent of the patients admitted to withholding information from
their therapists.167 Seventy percent of this information had to do with sexual
acts (thirty-six percent) and thoughts (thirty-four percent).' 68 Only nine per-
cent of the information withheld concerned thoughts of violence.' 69
The prominent cause for withholding information did not appear to be
the status of privilege but, instead, fear of the therapist's personal judgment.
For most of these patients the enactment of a privilege statute was inconse-
quential; they relied more heavily on the therapist's ethics for confidentiality
than the privilege; indeed, they were unaware of its existence. Therefore the
159. Id. at Question 4.
160. Id. at Question 3.
161. See Table 2, Appendix infra.
162. Id. at Question 1.
163. Id. at Question 2.
164. Id. at Question 4.
165. Id. at Question 6.
166. Id. at Question 7.
167. Id. at Question 11.
168. Id. at Question 12.
169. Id.
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actions of the legislature in enacting a psychotherapist-patient privilege had no
effect on the success or failure of their therapy.
E. Therapist Study
The eighty-four therapists who responded to the questionnaire were psy-
chiatrists ranging in age from twenty-seven to seventy-four and had practiced
from zero to forty-six years with a median of eleven years. 170 The majority
were in full time private practice and saw from three to seventy-five patients
each week, with their patients visiting them a median of once weekly. Al-
though they employed a wide variety of psychotherapeutic techniques, the ma-
jority used psychoanalytic psychotherapy and supportive psychotherapy.
Forty-eight percent of the therapist population had been requested to dis-
close confidential patient communications in court; however, only fifteen per-
cent had actually been required to disclose. 171 In the majority of cases some
alternative was devised. A total of approximately 128 requests to disclose had
been made, a median of two per therapist. We could not ascertain from our
data the total number of judicial disclosures.
None of the therapists stated that he knew any of his patients had been
harmed by his judicial disclosure,172 although thirteen respondents were un-
certain of the impact of their disclosure upon the patient. Twelve patients
were in therapy at the time disclosure was made; two terminated therapy pre-
maturely and the therapy of another two was affected. 173 In one case the dis-
closure became the focus of therapy, in the other the level of trust decreased.
Approximately twenty-three patients had terminated therapy prior to the
time of disclosure. Of these, five returned for further therapy with the same
psychiatrist. In one case, the former patient brought an action for malpractice
against the therapist.
Forty of the therapists sampled had also warned nonprofessionals, such as
family members not directly involved with the patient's treatment, of harm the
patient might visit upon them.174 Twenty-six warnings had been made in the
previous year. The therapists gave a median of three warnings during a me-
dian professional lifetime of eleven years. Thus, warnings about dangerous
patients were unusual events. The psychiatrists' warnings affected the treat-
ment of their patients for sixteen of the forty psychiatrists who had given
warnings. The effect varied from relief to violence. Four psychiatrists re-
ported that patients terminated therapy prematurely.
Ninety-five percent of the therapists discussed patients with colleagues.
In therapy, eighty-five percent of the therapists had taken the initiative in rais-.
ing the question of confidentiality, but only fourteen (seventeen percent) did
170. See Table 3, Appendix infra.
171. Id. at Question 5.
172. Id. at Question 6.
173. Id. at Question 7.
174. Id. at Question 9.
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so routinely. Eighteen percent did so only when legal problems or a possible
courtroom appearance made it necessary to reassure a patient who raised the
question of confidentiality, often a child or adolescent (seven, or eight per-
cent), or when there was danger to the patient or others (six, or eight percent).
When asked by patients if communications were held in strict confidence,
forty-seven percent of the respondents to this question said that confidentiality
would be maintained unless the patient was dangerous to himself, twenty-two
percent said that confidentiality would be maintained unless a court ordered
disclosure, and twelve percent said that confidentiality was absolute.175 Only
one respondent wrote that he asked his patient, "Why do you ask?"
Fifty-five percent of the respondents did not know of the existence of a
privilege statute, 76 and only twenty-two percent thought that the present legal
status of confidentiality in Texas limited patients' disclosures. 177
The responses to the questionnaire from the group of psychiatrists sur-
veyed indicated that the enactment of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
statute in 1979 had little impact on the practice of psychotherapy. Undoubt-
edly, a major contributing factor was the therapists' ignorance of the enact-
ment of the privilege statute. On the other hand, issues related to
confidentiality and to disclosure of information had a small but definite im-
pact. Nearly half of the group had been requested to disclose in court at some
time during the median practice time of eleven years, although only a third of
the group requested to disclose did so. While the group reported no actual
psychological harm done to patients by such disclosures, there were a few pre-
mature terminations of patients who were in therapy at the time, and in a few
instances, the disclosure and the issue of trust became the focus of therapy.
Some patients who had terminated therapy at the time of the disclosure re-
turned later to the same therapist for continued treatment.
F Judge Study
This questionnaire was administered to forty-eight of the fifty-six state
and federal judges in Dallas County, Texas with generally unlimited jurisdic-
tion over civil and criminal cases.178 We were unable to interview eight of the
judges.
The judges hearing civil cases were subdivided into those hearing domes-
tic relations cases--divorce, child custody, juvenile, probate, mental health-
and those hearing miscellaneous civil cases--personal injury, contract, prop-
erty and so on.
We interviewed twenty-one judges who heard criminal cases exclu-
sively. 179 The experience of these judges ranged from two to twenty years on
175. Id. at Question 12.
176. Id. at Question 14.
177. Id. at Question 13.
178. See Table 4, Appendix infra.
179. Id. at Question 1.
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the bench, with a mean of 7.09 years. 180 Only five of these judges reported
instances in which cases pending before them raised a question of the admissi-
bility of a statement made in confidence by a patient to his therapist.' 81 The
number may be reduced even further; those judges who reported the issue
arising referred to its occurrence in the context of examinations by court-ap-
pointed psychiatrists on the issue of competency to stand trial. Because of the
purpose of these examinations-testimony rather than therapy-it is clear that
they are not privileged communications.18 2
We interviewed seventeen judges assigned to hear civil cases other than
those involving domestic or probate/mental health issues.'8 3 Their experience
ranged from less than one year to eighteen years, with a mean of 8.91 years on
the bench.' 84 Seven of these judges had issues raised in cases before them
involving confidential communications between patient and psychothera-
pist.'I s Notably, the two judges who had served eighteen years and the one
who had served 17.75 years had never had the issue raised before them. Two
judges with ten and eleven years experience each had the issue raised ten
times, one with 3.5 years experience had it raised four times, one with two
years experience had it raised once, and one with less than a year's experience
had it raised twice.
Prior to the enactment of Texas' psychotherapist-patient privilege, these
judges indicated that they admitted into evidence relevant confidential com-
munications between patient and therapist.' 86 Only one judge indicated that
he had, prior to the statute's enactment, imposed a higher standard of rele-
vance for such communications or a requirement that information be sought
first from a nonconfidential source.187
The majority of judges who had experience with this issue were of the
opinion that these confidential communications were important to the case
and necessary for accurate resolution of contested judicial issues.188 They also
thought that the information was not available from a nonconfidential source
and its admission was not sought to harass or encourage settlement. 8 9
We interviewed eight judges who handled domestic cases. 190 These
judges had served from 1.5 to thirteen years with a mean of 4.75 years.' 91
Although these judges had served, on the average, for a shorter time than the
other judges questioned, all but one of the domestic relations judges had the
180. Id. at Question 2.
181. Id. at Question 3.
182. C. McCormick, supra note 44, § 99.
183. See Table 4 at Question 1, Appendix infra.
184. Id. at Question 2.
185. Id. at Question 3.
186. Id. at Questions 4.a.1 & .2.
187. Id.
188. Id. at Question 5.a & .b.
189. Id. at Questions 5.c, .d & .e.
190. Id. at Question 1.
191. Id. at Question 2.
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issue arise before them. 192 The judge with thirteen years experience estimated
that it rose fifty times a year in this court, the judge with six years experience
estimated that it arose five times, the judge with 1.5 years stated the issue arose
twenty times, and four other judges stated that it arose once.
These judges admitted relevant confidential communications between pa-
tient and therapist before the enactment of Texas' privilege statute and only
one imposed a higher threshhold of relevance.' 93 Although the majority of
judges thought the communications were important to the case, 194 four stated
they were never necessary for accurate resolution of contested issues, while
three thought they were. 195 The judges did, however, think this information
was not available from nonprivileged sources and was not sought only to har-
ass or force settlement. 196
The two judges197 we interviewed who heard probate/mental health cases
had five and eight years of judicial experience.198 One of these judges had not
had the issue arise, while the other judge stated that it had arisen fifty times. 199
However, answers to other questions by the judge cast doubt on this figure.
This judge admitted these communications prior to the privilege statute's en-
actment2°° and thought that the information was important and necessary for
accurate resolution of judicial issues.201
The issue of admitting into evidence confidential communications be-
tween patient and therapist arises consistently only in domestic cases. Because
of the jurisdiction of these courts, this information will bear upon questions of
divorce, child custody and termination.
Although not reflected by specific answers to our questionnaire, it was
apparent that judges, like patients and therapists, are often unaware of the
existence of the privilege. For example, one criminal court judge admitted
during the interview that he was unaware of the privilege and when given the
statutory citation read it for the first time in front of the questioner. Other
judges were less candid and asked for the citation so that they could examine
some particular subsection of the statute.
V. FrNDINms
.4 Does Lack of Privilege Deter Patients from Seeking Psychiatric or
Psychological Help?
Our study indicates that patients are probably not deterred from seeking
192. Id. at Question 3.
193. Id. at Questions 4.a.1 & .2.
194. Id. at Question 5a.
195. Id. at Question 5b.
196. Id. at Question 5., .d, & .e.
197. Id. at Question 1.
198. Id. at Question 2.
199. Id. at Question 3.
200. Id. at Question 4.a.1.
201. Id. at Question 5.a & .b.
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psychiatric help to any significant degree. Ninety-three percent of our lay
sample would have sought help for serious emotional problems. Seventy-four
percent of this group did not know whether there was a privilege statute or
guessed incorrectly that there was no privilege statute. Thus, the existence of a
privilege could not have provided an incentive or avoided a barrier to therapy
for these persons. Less than a quarter considered the possibility of disclosure
to an insurance carrier, a state agency, a potential employer, or a lawyer in a
trial in answering the question whether they would seek help from a therapist.
Most of the patients were unaware of the privilege; thus it played no role
in their decision to seek therapy. For ninety-six percent of the patients the
therapist's ethics, not the state of the law, provided assurances of confidential-
ity. This conclusion is bolstered by the insurance data we obtained. No surge
of new patients or psychotherapy sessions followed in the first full year of the
privilege's enactment.
B. Does Lack of Privilege Delay Seeking Help?
Our patient questionnaire indicates that the existence of privilege would
have encouraged only a few people to seek treatment earlier. It made no differ-
ence to ninety-one percent of the sample. The factor that seemed to account
most for a patient seeking help at any given time was evident from the pa-
tients' comments on their questionnaires-the degree of emotional discomfort
and the perceived seriousness and consequences of the emotional difficulty.
This conclusion is consistent with the Stanford Law Review study of
Tarasoff.202 People in California with emotional difficulties did not stop seek-
ing therapy merely because of a change in the legal protection governing the
therapist-patient relationship.
C Does Lack of Privilege Impair the Quality of Treatment?
Unless a person in therapy is correctly aware of the privilege, or its ab-
sence, the state of the law can have no effect on his decision to reveal informa-
tion to his therapist. The patients we questioned had been in therapy for a
median of three years, yet seventy-three percent did not know whether there
was a privilege statute or thought, incorrectly, that none existed. Similarly,
seventy-four percent of the lay group questioned did not know whether there
was a privilege statute or thought, incorrectly, that none existed. Of the twenty
patients we sampled who were concerned about confidentiality, only ten asked
that specific steps be taken to preserve confidentiality, and only one asked that
no written record be kept.
Because the median duration of treatment of the patient group was three
years, we may assume that this group of patients had basically stable, trusting
relationships with their therapists. Even so, these people had been less than
candid with their therapists. In this group, forty percent had withheld infor-
202. See text accompanying notes 124-37 supra.
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mation. By far the most prominent categories of information withheld were
sexual thoughts (thirty-four percent of items withheld) and sexual acts (thirty-
six percent). Thoughts of violence, including suicide, accounted for only nine
percent of the items withheld, and financial issues, another nine percent. It
seemed clear that the types of information withheld had far more to do with
projected concern about their therapists' personal responses to their thoughts
and behavior than about the possibility of disclosing legally punishable ac-
tions. However, the Stanford Law Review study showed that the therapist's
raising the issue of his duty to warn reduced communication about violent
tendencies. 20 3
Our group of patients very clearly viewed confidentiality as a requisite for
the trust necessary for therapy. When asked on what they relied most heavily
to guarantee the privacy of their communication with the therapist, patients
stated that they relied much more strongly on the therapist's ethics than on a
statutory guarantee of privilege. When the lay group was asked what they
would reveal to a psychiatrist or a psychologist, their responses were the same
when no comment was made about privilege as when privilege was specified.
When a no privilege condition was specified, the overall disclosure rate
dropped from seventy-six percent to fifty-three percent for all categories,
nearly doubling the nondisclosure rate.
From the above data, we conclude that withholding information from
therapists is common, but that it probably has little relationship to fear of
disclosure, and would therefore probably not be greatly enhanced by a statu-
tory privilege. The basic reason why patients withhold items is because they
fear the judgment of their therapists.
The outcome is different when the therapist threatens to disclose or actu-
ally discloses. Threats of disclosure reduce the communication of violent
urges and lead to premature termination of the patient-therapist relationship.
Actual disclosure leads to premature termination in a few cases, but there is no
positive evidence that emotional damage is done to patients who are called to
account for their behavior in a court of law.
The above data suggest that for some patients the quality of treatment
would be facilitated by a privilege statute, but that it would in no way lead to
full disclosure. Full disclosure is a personal issue between therapist and pa-
tient, and people do not fully reveal themselves merely because they are guar-
anteed an absolute privilege.
.D. Does Lack of Privilege Cause Premature Termination of Therapy?
The therapist's threat to disclose or his actual disclosure, whether or not it
is voluntary, causes a small number of premature terminations from therapy
and probably deters a large percentage of these people from seeking further
help. Yet, even prior to the passage of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
Texas, therapists were required to disclose confidential patient communica-
203. See text accompanying notes 124-37 supra.
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tions infrequently. Only fifteen percent of the therapists studied were ever
required to disclose. In the vast majority of cases some alternative solution
was devised.
E. Are Patients Psychologically Harmed by Their Therapists' Disclosures?
No convincing evidence exists that patients are harmed by their ther-
apists' disclosures. The therapist questionnaires revealed no positive evidence
of psychological harm. However, of the forty-eight respondents to this ques-
tion, thirteen did not know whether psychological harm occurred, presumably
because they were no longer following the patients concerned. One patient
brought a malpractice suit against his former therapist, presumably because of
damages that he or she thought were incurred as a result of the psychiatrist's
testimony. A few patients about whom therapists testified after the termina-
tion of their initial treatment later returned to the same therapists for
treatment.
F Does the Presence of Privilege Render Judicial Proceedings Inaccurate?
Although confidential communications between patient and therapist are
sought to be introduced occasionally in virtually all types of cases, they are
most consistently sought to be introduced in domestic relations cases. Thera-
pist testimony in these cases is most likely to bear upon child custody and
termination of the parent-child relationship. Thus, the most profound legal
effect the privilege may have is a limitation on the availability of evidence to
adjudicate these issues correctly. Although the majority of the judges han-
dling these cases thought that these communications were important to the
case, the judges differed in their opinions on whether this testimony was neces-
sary. Four judges thought these communications were not necessary for accu-
rate resolution of contested issues, while three thought that they were. None
of the judges thought that an alternative source of this information existed.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Proponents of the psychotherapist-patient privilege contend that it is ab-
solutely necessary for effective therapy; opponents deny this and contend that
it seriously impairs the accuracy of judicial proceedings. Our findings suggest
that both have overstated their cases. The existence of the privilege is conse-
quential in the inception and conduct of a therapeutic relationship for only a
small percentage of individuals who might consider psychotherapy for the
treatment of an emotional problem. However, relevant evidence is regularly
excluded through application of the privilege in only one category of cases, in
which the judges differ over the necessity of this evidence for accurate decision
making.
Although more research on this subject is necessary, some observations
can be made now. Most major social policy issues involve questions that are
subject to empirical testing and questions which are not. This is also true in
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the case of privilege. For a small percentage of people the psychotherapist-
patient privilege may have a marked bearing on the efficacy of their therapy
and in a small percentage of judicial proceedings the psychotherapist-patient
privilege may have a marked bearing on the accuracy of the proceedings. This
much empirical research can suggest. Which is more important? This question
is not subject to empirical validation but calls instead for weighing of values.
Our research cannot choose between competing values; it can, however, clarify
the stakes in this choice.
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Age: (n = 121)
Range = 17-57
Median = 24
Sex: (n = 120)
F = 71 (59%)
M = 49 (41%)
1.5:1
Marital Status: (n = 118)
Married = 39 (33%)
Single = 66 (56%)
Divorced = 12 (10%)
Widowed = 1 (1%)
Occupation: (n = 110)
Office/Clerical
Professional
Technician
Student
Unskilled labor
Sales
Managerial
Skilled labor
Housewife
Beauty Operator
Waitress
Police
25%
12%
11%
10%
9%
8%
7%
7%
5%
3%
2%
1%
100%
1. If you had a serious emotional problem would you consider seeking help
from a psychiatrist?
Yes = 112 (92.5%)
No = 9(7.5%)
2. If you would consider seeking such help and the following subjects were
important, would you reveal them to the psychologist or psychiatrist?
2. No condition 6. Privilege 7. No
condition
a. Speeding
b. Sexual fantasies
c. Physical violence
d. Masturbation
e. Work failure
f. Other sexual acts
g. Cheating on income
tax
h. Theft
TOTAL
Avg. non-disclosure
86%
73%
86%
69%
89%
74%
79%
96 79% 93
769 79% avg. 731
86%
67%
83%
61%
84%
70%
76%
77%
76% avg.
21% 24%
49%
55%
57%
51%
48%
54%
59%
37%
12%
26%
10%
36%
24%
17%
69 57% 20%
513 53% avg.
47% 27%
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APPENDIX
Table I
L4Y QUESTIONNAIRE. DATA SUMMARY
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3. When you answered questions 1 and 2, did you consider that your psy-
chologist or psychiatrist might be asked about your conversation with
him?
a. By your insurance carrier
b. By a state agency
c. By a potential employer
d. By a lawyer in a trial
15 (12%)
17 (14%)
18 (15%)
27 (22%)
4. Is there a law in Texas that prevents a court from forcing a psychologist or
psychiatrist called as a witness at a trial to state what his patient told him?
Yes = 26% No = 7% D/K = 67%
5. If there is such a law, may the psychologist or psychiatrist be required to
testify in any of the following situations?
PRIVILEGE
YES NO
a. You are charged with murder and what you told
the psychologist or psychiatrist proves that you
did it.
b. You sue someone for emotional injuries suffered
in an accident, but the psychiatrist or psychologist
thinks your problems started before the accident.
c. You and your spouse seek a divorce and fight
over child custody and some things you told the
psychologist or psychiatrist will not help your
case.
60% 36%
40% 55%
60% 36%
6. Assume that the law in Texas does prevent a court from forcing a psychol-
ogist or psychiatrist called as a witness at trial to state what his patient told
him and the following subjects were important to your discussions with
him or her. Would you reveal to the psychiatrist or the psychologist:
[See answers to Question 2]
7. If there were no such law and a psychiatrist or psychologist could be
forced to tell in court what you revealed in therapy, would it affect your
discussion with the psychiatrist or psychologist of:
[See answers to Question 2]
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Table 2
PATIENT Q UESTIONNAIRE
(n = 79)
DATA SUMMARY
Age: (n = 78)
Range = 17-59
Median = 36
Sex: (n = 78)
F = 57 (73%)
M = 21 (27%)
3.5:1
Marital Status: (n = 79)
M = 42 (53%)
S = 22 (28%)
D = 14 (18%)
W= 1(1%)
Occupation: (n =71)
Professional 22 31%
Housewife 10 14%
Office/Clerical 7 9%
Student 6 8%
Managerial 5 7%
Unemployed 4 5%
Retired 3 4%
Unskilled labor 3 4%
Sales 2 3%
Artist/Photograper 2 3%
Skilled technical 2 3%
Technician 1 1%
Consultant 1 1%
Self-employed 1 1%
Beauty Operator 1 1%
Flight Attendant 1 1%
71 96%
Therapy: Range = 1 week - 17 years; Median 3 years, most seen once a
week.
1. Do you think there is a law which prohibits psychiatrists from disclosing
what patients tell them to: (n = 78)
a. the psychiatrist's friends: Yes = 23 (29%)
No = 43 (55%)
D/K = 12 (15%)
b. the psychiatrist's professional Yes = 13 (17%)
colleagues: No = 50 (65%)
D/K = 14 (18%)
c. a court of law: Yes = 21 (27%)
No = 39 (50%)
D/K = 18 (23%)
2. Was the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship a consideration
for you when you first started thinking about therapy?
(n = 79) Yes = 43 (54%)
1982]
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3. If your answer to (2) was "yes," was it: (n = 43)
a. A very important consideration (you had great
concern about the privacy of your communication) 16 (20%)
b. A not important consideration (you wondered
briefly if your communication to the doctor might
be disclosed, but didn't think further about it) ...... 17 (22%)
c. Somewhere between (a) and (b) ..................... 10 (13%)
4. If you were concerned about the confidentiality of the relationship, did
you ask the doctor about it?
(n = 79) Yes = 22 (28%)
5. Did you take any steps to insure the confidentiality of the relationship,
like ask the doctor not to keep written records or obtain his word that he
would not disclose what you told him?
(n = 72) Yes = 10 (13%)
a. What did you do?
Asked that sessions not be taped ................... 2
Asked that the physician not disclose his written
record ........................................ 1
Asked the doctor not to keep record ................ 1
Asked the doctor not to disclose .................... 1
6. If you had known there was a law prohibiting psychiatrists from disclos-
ing what patients tell them, would you have sought treatment earlier?
(n=77) Yes=6 (8%) No =70 (91%) N/A= 1 (1%)
7. On what did you most strongly rely to guarantee the privacy of your
communication to the psychiatrist?
a. His ethics .......................................... 96%
b. The generally accepted principle that the doctor-
patient relationship is confidential .................. 93%
c. A law forbidding disclosure ........................ 12%
8. Have you ever wondered if there is a law prohibiting the psychiatrist
from telling what you tell him?
(n = 78) Yes = 35 (45%)
9. Have you ever asked if such a law exists?
(n = 79) Yes = 8 (10%)
10. If you answered (8) "yes" and (9) "no," why not?
Relied on doctor's ethics or trust of the doctor .......... 9
Weren't concerned greatly .............................. 5
Assumed there was such a law .......................... 3
Didn't consider problems to be of a legal matter ........ 3
Didn't wonder until receiving the form .................. 2
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Knew of law's existence ................................ 1
Felt doctor would have been insulted ................... 1
Was very non-assertive ................................. 1
Assumed release would be required ..................... I
Had discussed legal aspects ............................. 1
Attorney felt Texas had no effective privilege ........... 1
Knew there was none and it wouldn't do any good if
there was .......................................... 1
Was informed by doctor that there was such a law ...... 1
11. Was there anything withheld from your psychiatrist?
(n = 79) Yes = 31 (40%)
12. What kind of information did you withhold? (n = 53)
a. Thoughts of violence ............................... 5 (9%)
b. Acts of violence .................................... 0 ( 0%)
c. Sexual thoughts ................................... 18 (34%)
d. Sexual acts ............................. 19 (36%)
e. Financial issues .................................... 5 (9%)
f. Possible crimes ..................................... 2 (4%)
g. Drugs or medications taken ......................... 2 (4%)
g. Other .............................................. 2 (4% )
One patient noted that withholding information may not be related to
legal privilege.
1982]
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Table 3
THER,4PIST PRIVILEGE QUESTIONNAIRE DAT
SUMMARY
Questionnaires mailed = 186 Questionnaires returned = 84 (45%)
Respondent characteristics (n = 84)
Age: Sex: Years in Practice:
Range = 27-74 years F = 16 Range = 0-46
Median = 44 M =58
1. Type of Practice
Full-time outpatient (private) ........................... 28 ( 33%)
Full-time inpatient and outpatient (private) ............. 27 (32%)
Part-time practice (less than 20 hours/week) ............ 13 (15%)
Institutional practice .................................... 16 (20%)
84 (100%)
2. Number of Patients Seen Per Week:
Range = 3-75 Average = 29.64
3. Usual Frequency of Visits/Patient/Week:
Range = 1-5 Median = 1
4. Type of Psychotherapy Practiced (Multiple answers allowed)
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy .......................... 76 (90%)
Supportive Psychotherapy .............................. 63 (75%)
Marital Counseling ..................................... 45 (53%)
Behavior Therapy ...................................... 15 (18%)
Psychoanalysis ......................................... 13 (15%)
Cognitive Therapy ..................................... 12 (14%)
Hypnosis ............................................... I1 (13%)
(Also listed: Rational-Emotive Therapy, Gestalt Therapy, Family Ther-
apy, Play Therapy, Pharmacoiherapy, Transactional Analysis, Interper-
sonal, Crisis Intervention)
5. Have you ever been requested to disclose in court information revealed
to you in therapy?.
(n = 81) Yes = 39 (48%) No = 42 (52%)
a. How many times has this happened to you?
(A = 35) Range = 0-40 Median = 2
b. Were you forced to disclose at any time?
(n = 56) Yes = 13 (16% of 81)
c. If your answer to 5b was "no" for one or more cases, how did you
avoid disclosure?
Wasn't necessary .................................. I
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Granted privilege .................................. 3
Negotiated prior to court ........................... 1
Lied ............................................... 1
Felt best interest of patient ......................... 1
6. If you did disclose, were any of your patients psychologically harmed?
(n = 48) Yes = 0 No = 20 D/K = 13 N/A = 15
7. How many of the patients about whom you disclosed were in therapy at
the time? (n = 25)
0 = 15 respondents
1 = 7 respondents
2 = 1 respondent
all = 1 respondent
few = 1 respondent
a. Did any terminate prematurely because of the disclosure?
(n = 23) Yes = 2 No = 21 N/A = I
b. Was therapy affected, and if so, in what way?
(n=8) Yes=2 N/A=5 ?= 1
8. How many of the patients about whom you disclosed had terminated
therapy with you? (n = 30)
N/A = 5 respondents
0 = 10 respondents
1 = 10 respondents
2 = 2 respondents
3 = 1 respondent
All = 1 respondent
Few = 1 respondent
a. Did any return to therapy afterward? (n = 32) N/A = 11
respondents Yes = 5 respondents No = 16 respondents
b. If not, why not?
Patient brought malpractice suit .................... 1
Patient moved from Dallas ......................... 1
D eceased .......................................... 1
Patient was a child ................................. 1
Could not afford ................................... 1
Imprisoned ........................................ 1
9. Have you ever warned a person who was not a professional directly in-
volved in your patient's treatment that you thought your patient might
harm him?
(n = 79) Yes = 40 (51%) No = 39 (49%)
a. How many times last year? (n = 42)
Total = 26 warnings Average = 0.3 warnings
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
0 = 13 respondents
1 = 12 respondents
2 = 9 respondents
3 = 4 respondents
? = 1 respondent
b. How many times in your career? (n = 39)
Range = 0-40 Median = 3
c. If your answer to 9 was "yes," did it affect your therapy of your
patient? (n = 38)
Yes=16 No=20 ?=1 N/A= l
1) If "yes," in what way? (n = 19)
It scared all of us .............................. 1
I work with children, usually prelude to hospi-
talization ................................... 1
Variable = anger to relief ...................... 11
Became a focus of therapy-issue of confidenti-
ality and self-control ........................ 1
Violence ....................................... 1
Hospitalized patient ............................ 3
Patient helped or relieved ...................... 7
Changed therapists at my request ............... 1
Usually conflict about my viewpoint ............ 1
2) If "yes," did the patient terminate prematurely?
(n = 26) Yes = 4 (15%) No = 22 (85%)
10. Do you ever discuss patients with colleagues?
(n = 76) Yes = 72 (95%) No = 4 (5%)
a. If "yes," what do you discuss? (n = 65)
Diagnosis and problems in treatment ............... 36
Psychodynamic issues .............................. 10
All aspects .......................................... 6
Only with patient's approval ........................ 2
Issues related to collaboration ...................... 3
Dangerousness to self, others ....................... I
Convict ............................................ 1
Other .............................................. 6
11. Do you ever take the initiative in raising questions of confidentiality with
your patients?
(n = 79) Yes = 67 (85%) No = 12 (15%)
a. If "yes," under what circumstances? (n = 54)
Routine ............................................ 14
Where legal problems or courtroom appearance
possible ....................................... 14
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When patient concerned ............................ 8
When therapist wishes to share, or wants outside
information, or is asked for information ........ 8
To reassure patient (usually a child, adolescent) .... 7
When there is danger to patient or others ......... 6
When patient is V.I.P ............................... 1
When patient is friend or relative of someone I
know or work with ............................ 1
12. What do you tell patients if they ask you if you will keep what they say in
strict confidence?
I will keep confidence unless self or others endangered .. 36 ( 47%)
I will keep confidence unless ordered by court .......... 17 (22%)
I will keep confidence as far as law allows .............. 10 (13%)
I will keep confidence absolute ......................... 9 (12%)
I will keep confidence unless patient involves others,
such as third party payor ........................... 3 ( 4%)
Iask why .............................................. 1 ( 1%)
I say there is no confidentiality ......................... 1 (1 1%)
Total responses .................................... 77 (100%)
a. How do your patients react?
Accepting (positive, reassured, relieved) ......... 67 (79%)
Varies ............................................. 10 ( 11% )
Defensively, angrily, hesitantly ...................... 4 ( 5%)
Surprised ......................................... 3 ( 3%)
Occasionally leave therapy .......................... 1 ( 1%)
They explore their reasons for asking ............... I 1%)
Total responses ................................ 86 (100%)
13. Do you think that the present status of confidentiality in Texas limits
some of what your patients tell you? (n = 75)
Yes = 16 (22%) No = 57 (76%) ? = 1 (1%)
N/A = 1 (1%)
a. If so, why? (n = 17)
Patients don't know how or are not concerned ...... 5
Legal reasons, fear of family ........................ 4
W e don't have it ................................... 1
Records can be subpoenaed ........................ 1
We have confidentiality ............................ 2
Patients don't feel free to confide deepest urges or
fantasies ..................................... 1
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14. Do you think there is a legal privilege protecting communications be-
tween a psychotherapist and his patient in Texas? (n = 77)
Yes = 35 No = 33 D/K = 9
55% didn't know or were wrong.
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Table 4
JUDICIAL QUESTIONNA4IRE DATA SUMMARY
(n = 48)
1. What types of cases do you hear?
a. Dom estic ............................................ 8
b. Criminal ............................................ 21
c. Probate/Mental Health (MH) ........................ 2
d. Miscellaneous Civil ................................. 17
2. How long have you been a judge of this court?
Domestic Criminal Probate/MH Misc. Civ. Total
0 - 1 years= 0 0 0 1 1
2- 5 years= 5 8 0 5 18
6 -10 years = 2 5 2 4 13
11 - 15 years = 1 5 0 3 9
16 - 20 years = 0 2 0 3 5
3. In how many cases you have heard has a question arisen concerning the
admission of a statement made in confidence by a patient to his
psychiatrist?
Domestic Criminal Probate/MH Misc. Civ. Total
0- 5 6 15 0 15 36
6-20 0 3 0 2 5
11-20 1 0 0 0 1
21-30 0 1 0 0 1
31-40 0 0 0 0 0
41-50 0 0 1 0 1
51 -up 1 1 0 0 2
4. On August 27, 1979, House Bill 1163 creating a psychotherapist-patient
privilege became effective.
a. Before this statute became effective, when a confidential communica-
tion between a psychiatrist and patient was sought to be admitted,
how did you resolve this issue?
1. Always admitted if relevant:
Yes No
Domestic 3 0
Criminal 2 0
Probate/MH 1 0
Misc. Civil 4 0
10 0
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2. Imposed a more stringent standard of relevance:
Yes
Domestic 1
Criminal 0
Probate/MH 0
Misc. Civil 1
2
3. Admitted only if information not available
confidential source:
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from a non-
Domestic
Criminal
Probate/MH
Misc. Civil
4. Other:
Never admitted = 1 (Misc. Civil)
b. How many times did the question of privileged communication
between psychotherapist and patient arise between August 27, 1979,
and September 1, 1980?
Domestic Criminal Probate/MH Misc. Civil Total
c. Please estimate how many times this occurred in the year prior to the
enactment of the statute.
Domestic Criminal Probate/MH Misc. Civil Total
0 0 1 1
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5. When the question of admitting confidential communications between
psychotherapist and patient arose in a case, were you of the opinion that
the information involved was (check appropriate blank):
Often Rarely Never
a. Important to the case
Domestic 4 1 2
Criminal 5 1 2
Probate/MH 1 0 0
Misc. Civil 3 0 1
13 2 5
b. Necessary for accurate resolution
of contested factual issues
Domestic 3 0 4
Criminal 3 2 3
Probate/MH 1 0 0
Misc. Civil 3 0 1
10 2 8
c. Available from non-privileged
sources
Domestic 0 0 3
Criminal 1 0 3
Probate/MH 1 0 0
Misc. Civil 0 1 3
2 1 9
d. Sought to encourage settlement
Domestic 0 1 5
Criminal 0 2 3
Probate/MH 0 0 0
Misc. Civil 0 2 2
0 5 10
e. Sought only to harass
Domestic 0 1 5
Criminal 0 0 5
Probate/MH 0 1 0
Misc. Civil 1 2 3
1 4 13
f. Other (specify)
Domestic 0 0 0
Criminal 0 0 0
Probate/MH 0 0 0
Misc. Civil 0 0 0
0 0 0
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Table 5
BLUE CR OSS/BL UE SHIELD OF TEXAS
1976 1977 1978 1979
nc
10,174 10,829 8,560 10,230
1 hour 39,462 35,405 40,753 47,873
Psychotherapy, half-
hour
Psychotherapy, 45
minutes
Psychotherapy, Group,
1 hours
Total Number of
Patient Visits
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1980
9,682
41,293
130,171 134,252 113,072 102,933 100,734
- 4,789 6,853 9,023 18,581
9,256
189,063
8,051
193,326
8,631
177,869
8,995
179,054
13,180
183,470
Initial Psychiat
Interview
Psychotherapy,
